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This study examines the relationship between the government aid and intimate partner 
violence. Agnew’s General Strain Theory (GST) is used to explain the relationship 
between poverty and intimate partner violence. Using the individual level data of 8,000 
women, this study examines whether the government aid moderates the effect of living in 
poverty on intimate partner violence. Using the data from the survey questions, a logistic 
regression analysis is conducted. Results reveal that the relationship between living in 
poverty and likelihood of intimate partner violence was supported. However, this study 
does not support the relationship between government aid and intimate partner violence. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is a serious problem in the United States. , 
According to the National Crime Victimization Survey, between 1992 and 1996 an 
average of 18,000 people were assaulted by an intimate partner at work each year 
(Warchol, 1998). In addition, statistically, about 1 million violence crimes are committed 
against persons by their current or former spouses, boyfriends, or girlfriends every year 
(Rennison, 2001). Considering that unreported IPV is excluded from these figures, it is 
clear that IPV is one of the major problems in the United States.  
IPV brings about adverse consequences to victims that ultimately affect their 
physical and psychological health. These include fear, anxiety, self-esteem problems, 
sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), and sexual dysfunction (Koss, 1993). Bonomi et al. 
(2006) state that women who experience physical and/or sexual IPV show lower social 
functioning, and severe depressive symptoms than women who have never experienced 
abuse in this lives. IPV also accounts for a significant proportion of injuries and 
emergency room visits for women, making this a leading cause of female homicides 
(Coker, 2000; Frye, 2001; McLeer et al., 1989). To suppress their emotional trauma, 
victims often turn to drugs and alcohol to self-medicate; this, however, is a short-term 
remedy that causes other health problems (Schafran, 1996).  
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Anyone can be subjected to IPV. However, many researchers argue that a 
person’s social circumstance, such as financial status, could be a risk factor to being 
victimized (Benson et al., 2003; Coker et al., 2000; Pazzani, 2007). There are many 
possible reasons why couples living in poverty experience more violence than their 
wealthier counterparts. One is that couples experiencing economic distress may become 
violent because they argue more over money matters, and the stress or frustration caused 
by their arguments can lead one or both to violent behavior (Benson et al., 2003). 
Another possibility is that men who have a lower socioeconomic status (SES) are 
exposed to greater social stress, but it is the fact that they possess fewer resources such as 
economic security to cope with the stress that leads domestic violence (Babcock et al., 
1993). Finally, spousal violence against women could reflect efforts to dominate and 
control women in marital relationships (Macmillan & Gartner, 1999). Therefore, women 
with few economic resources cannot easily leave their partner, leading to higher rates of 
IPV.  As evidenced by the above-mentioned studies (Babcock et al., 1993; Benson et al., 
2003; Bonomi et al., 2006; Macmillan & Gartner, 1999), poverty might, thus, present a 
higher risk of intimate partner violence. Thus, it also indicates that women in poor 
families will have higher rates of IPV compared with economically empowered women 
in stable families. In addition, this has severe implications for the United States, given its 
recent economic downturn, as more women will become vulnerable to IPV. 
If it is true that as more people are becoming poor and this poverty increases in 
the United States, more women will become vulnerable to IPV, then things are getting 
worse. The U.S. Census Bureau defines poverty as follows: “[I]f a family’s gross income 
is less than that family’s threshold, then that family and every individual in it are 
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considered to live in poverty” (U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/methods/definitions.html).  Therefore, the poverty 
rate shows the proportion of people with income below the appropriate poverty threshold. 
There were 43.6 million people living in poverty in the United States in 2009. Moreover, 
this poverty rate increased between 2008 and 2009. The official poverty rate in 2009 was 
14.3 %, up from 13.2 % in 2008, and was the highest poverty rate since 1994. In addition, 
the earnings of women who worked full- time, year-round were only 77% of what the 
corresponding men earned (DeNavas-Walt et al., 2010). Appendix A presents the Census 
Bureau Poverty Thresholds from 1993 to 2010. The estimated thresholds for 2010 reflect 
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) increases of 2.5% over 2009. 
If increasing financial resources reduces IPV, the government might be able to 
play a role in solving the problem by establishing proper policy to address this issue. 
According to the Congressional Research Service, more than 80 benefit programs provide 
cash and noncash forms of aid to persons with limited income (Burke, 2003). The amount 
per person spent on these programs grew at an annual rate of 5.4% between 1968 and 
2004. However, the proportion of cash welfare spent per person has fallen (Burke, 2003). 
In 1935, the Aid to Dependent Children program was created by the Social Security Act 
as a way to protect children against poverty. Benefits were provided to needy children 
who were unable to receive support due to death, incapacity, or absence of a parent 
(Hoynes, 1996). The name of the program changed at mid-century to Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC), and the number of recipients increased dramatically 
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s after major program changes from the war on 
poverty and the civil rights movement (Danziger, 2010). In 1935, the primary reason for 
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the absence of a father was death, but this was to change in later years as that absence 
was more a result of divorce or out-of-wedlock childbearing. The standards of eligibility 
also changed. The original program was created on the premise that mothers with young 
children should not be expected to work.  However, this changed in the later years so that 
eligibility also required families to have income and assets below specified levels 
(Moffitt, 2003).  
Under the AFDC program, federal and state governments shared the 
responsibility. States especially had a large role in the program, including not only 
creating and administering their own AFDC programs but also setting the level of basic 
benefits. States subsequently picked very different benefit levels, with benefits suggesting 
increasing from decreasing. Thus, the states ended up being primarily responsible for the 
level of benefits (Moffitt, 2003). Therefore, under AFDC, all applicants who met a state’s 
minimum income and had minor-aged children were entitled to receive cash assistance. 
Appendix B shows the differences of AFDC benefit level by state for 1996.  
In 1996, the average number of AFDC recipients was 13 million, and the total 
annual expenditure on the program was $18 billion (Johnson et al, 1999). However, in 
1996, welfare reform meant the end of the entitlement to cash assistance. President 
Clinton signed a Republican bill, and AFDC was replaced with the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) program. Current welfare policy allows each state to decide 
who receives assistance, subject only to a requirement that they receive “fair and 




By applying Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory, the relationship between poverty 
and crime can be explained. In 1992, Agnew extended Merton’s theory by presenting a 
general strain theory of crime and delinquency (Agnew, 1992). In this general strain 
theory, Agnew (1992) introduced three major types of strain:  
(1) Strain as the actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively valued goals 
(2)  Strain as the actual or anticipated removal of positively valued stimuli 
(3) Strain as the actual or anticipated presentation of negatively valued stimuli 
 The general strain theory explains why women in poverty have a higher 
possibility of suffering from IPV than women living in more stable conditions. A woman 
who has low economic resources could be controlled by her intimate partner who is under 
considerable strain or pressure from living in poverty, and this controlling power might 
lead to violence towards her. Thus, the strain theory would predict that poor women who 
live in states that offer more benefits would be less likely to be victims of IPV compared 
with those who live in states that offer fewer benefits. Based on the strain theory, this 
study therefore hypothesizes that Intimate Partner Violence is more prevalent for women 
who living in poverty and government aid might moderate the effect of living in poverty 
on Intimate Partner Violence by reducing people’s considerable strain or economic 
pressure. This study expands the literature on IPV beyond individual predictors by 
examining how different amounts of government aid for women living in poverty 
influence women’s vulnerability to IPV.  By understanding how government aid 
moderates the effect of living in poverty on IPV, this study might help researchers and 
policy makers develop targeted interventions to decrease IPV.   
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 This study analyzed information from 8,000 women aged 18 years and above, 
residing in households throughout the United States, who responded to a survey aimed at 
understanding violence against women and men. The survey was carried out on behalf of 
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the National Center for Injury Prevention and 
Control (NCIPC), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), jointly 
sponsored by the National Violence against Women (NVAW) office in 2000, and was 
aimed at exploring women’s and men’s fear and physical and psychological experiences 
of the crime (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). This survey was administrated from November 
1995 to May 1996. Because President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) on August 22, 1996, which 
replaced the AFDC program, this survey represents the final years of AFDC dispersions. 
With these data, the thesis seeks, most importantly, to estimate the relationship between 










Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 Many studies have been conducted in order to estimate how considerable strain or 
pressure relates to crime. These studies suggest that there must be an underlying reason 
that such strain would affect crime. Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory presents a 
much broader version of Merton’s (1938) strain theory. He attempts to measure strain by 
asking individuals how satisfied they are with their financial situation. By asking this 
question, criminality would be predicted, with the more dissatisfied being more criminal. 
Agnew suggests that strain increases the likelihood of crime because it causes negative 
emotions such as anger and frustration, thus creating pressure for corrective action, 
namely, crime. According to Agnew, failure to achieve valued goals is only one of 
several types of strain. As mentioned earlier, Agnew described three major types of strain, 
which refer to different types of negative relationships with others. The first strain is 
“prevent one from achieving positively valued goals” (p.51). He defines this kind of 
strain as the disjunction between expectation and actual achievement. He regards 
expectation as not only focused on income expectations but also on all manners of 
positive stimuli. Thus, he states that the failure to achieve such expectations may lead to 
such emotions as anger, rage, and disappointment; and these emotions are eventually 
associated with strain in criminology. The second strain he described is “strain as the 
removal of positive valued stimuli from the individual” (p. 57). So, for example, if an 
individual experiences loss of something/someone that gives positively valued stimuli, it 
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is regarded as a stressful life event. This stressful life event may lead to crime, as the 
individual tries to retrieve the lost stimuli or obtain substitute stimuli, or seek revenge 
against those responsible for the loss. The last strain he described is “strain as the 
presentation of negative stimuli” (p. 58). The presentation of negative stimuli is generally 
focused on aggression, meaning that while an individual presents one’s negative stimuli, 
it creates aggression that might lead to crime.  
Agnew (1992) suggests that strains are most likely to cause crime if they are 
greater in magnitude or size, recent, happened of long duration, and clustered in time. For 
example, magnitude refers to the perceived size or amount that was lost. The exact 
definition is different from person to person depending on how they standardize their 
losses. Moreover, he argues that in recent data, chronic stressors and events closely 
clustered in time have a greater effect on negative outcomes such as crime. In addition, 
Agnew argues that unjust strains are more likely to lead to crime because it makes 
individuals angrier. For example, when people believe that the strain they have 
experienced is undeserved, they get angrier, which may lead them to commit crime. 
Finally, the general strain theory suggests that these strains increase the likelihood of 
experiencing negative emotions, including anger, frustration, depression, and fear. 
Among negative emotions, he insists that anger typically creates a desire to take 
corrective steps; thus, it is the most conducive to crime. Therefore, these negative 
emotions ultimately increase the likelihood of crime because they create pressure for 
corrective action (i.e., crime) as a means of reducing or escaping these strains.   
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 In the thesis, analyzing partner’s income supports the first types of strain, and it 
eventually supports the hypothesis that IPV is more prevalent for women who are living 
in poverty. If a respondent’s partner is currently receiving low income, it might mean that 
the partner is exposed to negative stimuli. Thus, exposure to negative stimuli may lead to 
emotions such as anger and rage, and these emotions are eventually associated with strain. 
In addition, a partner’s unemployment status can be used to measure the same types of 
strain as income; as presentation of negatively valued stimuli. Such exposure to negative 
stimuli causes stress and leads to strain.  
As mentioned earlier, the strain increases the likelihood of experiencing negative 
emotions. Thus, in order to alleviating these strains, the unemployed partner or the 
partner with low income is more likely to commit IPV than a partner who is employed or 
who receives more income. In 2006, Agnew identifies specific types of strain: objective 
and subjective. Objective strain is defined as an event or condition that most individuals 
would perceive as negative. Subjective strain “refers to an event or condition that is 
disliked by the particular person or persons being examined” (Agnew, 2006, p.10). For 
example, most people consider the death of partner is a bigger problem than losing a job. 
It is called Objective strain in Agnew’s general strain theory. However, someone might 
consider that losing a job is a bigger problem than death of partner. It is called Subjective 
strain.  
 To measure its magnitude, Agnew (1992) explains that magnitude refers to the 
amount of pain or discomfort inflicted with respect to the exposure to negative stimuli. 
He also explains that magnitude ratings are sometimes used to weight the events in scale. 
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However, this study does not have a good indicator of magnitude. Therefore, the study 
assumes that people living different life might feel strain differently. In other words, 
employment status or income makes people feel different kinds of strain. Thus, this study 
interpreted these different levels of strain s as magnitude.  Therefore, to measure if the 
low income/or unemployment status is more influential, examining magnitude, which is 
level of income/or employment can be used. For strain caused exposure to negative 
stimuli, the size of the gap between one’s goals and reality can be used as magnitude. In 
other words, comparing IPV prevalence of level of each partner’s income such as low 
income and medium income or high income represents its magnitude. Because there is no 
indicator of perpetrator’s goals in the survey, I assume that their one of the goals is 
having money, so that they do not have worry about living life. In addition, comparing 
IPV prevalence of each employment status such as unemployment and part-time or full-
time employment also represents its magnitude. Therefore, these comparing level of 
income/employment eventually telling us which income/employment status are more 
likely to cause strain than the other. With this, the study figures out the fact that the strain 
leads to violence.  
However, there are limitations to measure general strain theory in the thesis. The 
presentation of negative stimuli; the third types of strain Agnew suggested, cannot be 
measured using the available data. In addition, other measurement except magnitude 
which are recency, duration, and clustering, cannot be measured in the thesis. Because 
the study is not longitudinal and the data do not mention how long they are unemployed, 
there is difficult to measure recency, duration, and clustering of strain. This limitation 
will be mentioned again later.  
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There might be an alternative explanations explaining relationship between 
poverty and IPV. The theory of assortative mating suggests that experiencing IPV might 
just be a result of assortative mating where people pick partners who are violent because 
of their own tendency to be violent. According to Vanyukov et al. (1996), the theory of 
assortative mating suggests that individuals enter into romantic relationships with others 
who share their characteristics and preferences. In other words, people tend to become 
romantically involved with others who are like them and who engage in similar activities, 
namely, assortative mating suggests that people choose their partner who share same 
characteristic such as low self-control or impulsive, and these characteristics leads them 
to poverty because of their characteristics, and it also leads them in to IPV.  Therefore, in 
order to check whether assortative mating leads to being poor and being a victim of IPV, 
their personal characteristic such as low self-control need to be measured.  If the couple’s 
same personal characteristics do not affect their poverty and IPV and strain does then, the 
general strain theory would predict more strongly explaining how strain supports 
relationship between living in poverty and IPV.  
 
Empirical Findings related to poverty and IPV 
There have been mixed findings regarding relationship between economic distress 
and IPV. For example, Benson et al. (2003) found a positive relationship between 
economic distress and domestic violence. They view economic distress as two aspects, 
employment and income, which are objective and subjective. Objective economic distress 
means economic problems such as unemployment or insufficient income, which can 
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negatively affect the needs of one’s family. On the other hand, subjective economic 
distress indicates feelings of anxiety or worry about money, or worry about losing one’s 
job. Benson et al. investigated the effects of individual economic distress on intimate 
violence against women and revealed the fact that male unemployment rates and the 
likelihood of violence are significantly related. In addition, they found that male-to-
female violence occurs more frequently among couples that report greater financial strain 
than among those who feel less strain. Therefore, they concluded that in the case of 
objective distress, which represents employment instability, unemployment makes men’s 
sense of self-worth vulnerable and men become sensitive to affronts to their authority. In 
addition, subjective distress, or dissatisfaction of economic status, also presents great risk 
of intimate violence; and this financial strain increases the likelihood of domestic 
violence (Benson et al., 2003).  
Similarly, Babcock et al. (1993) argue that men who batter their wives were more 
likely to have lower income levels and lower occupational statuses than nonviolent men. 
They view domestic violence as a power-related problem. Thus, a man who doesn’t have 
power, such as economic status, may regain some power through the use of physical 
dominance. Finally, they conclude that individuals who are deficient in resources, such as 
economic ones, may have to rely on their physical resources, such as physical threat and 
violence, to promote their interests. Additionally, Macmillan and Gartner (1999) 
analyzed the relationship between employment and risk of marital violence against 
women as symbolic. They found that women’s risks of spousal abuse decreases when 
their male partners are also employed; but when their male partners are unemployed, the 
13 
 
risks of spousal violence increases. Therefore, they suggest that domestic violence 
reflects men’s attempt to dominate and control their women in marital relationships.  
Much of the feminist literature has the same views on domestic violence about its 
effects of relative economic status between the women and their partner in relationship. 
The feminist literature states that the most important contribution has been to emphasize 
that the primary cause of domestic violence is the gendered nature of power and control 
in intimate partner relationships; thus, violence against wives is a behavior that has a goal 
of maintaining male dominance of the social climate (Hamby, 2000). In 1996, Hamby 
suggested a new conceptualization of dominance, “disparagement,” which further 
explicates the links between dominance and partner violence. He explains that 
disparagement occurs when one partner fails to equally value the other partner and has an 
overall negative appraisal of his or her partner’s worth. He finds out that disparagement is 
related to decision-making power through a survey of 131male and female 
undergraduates attending one of two colleges in the northeast (Hamby, 1996). Thus, it 
might explain the reason why women place themselves more at risk when they take a job, 
or acquire their own assets, at least in the short term, and why many domestic violence 
cases involve disproportionately high number of low-income men (Bachman & Lindae, 
1995; Hirschel et al, 1992). According to Atkinso et al. (2005), when husbands held 
traditional gender ideologies, women who earned more than their partners were at 
increased risk of violence. They suggest that when men defines masculinity as in terms of 
being the breadwinner, and their partners earn a significant portion of household income, 
intimate violence might be used to compensate for the symbolic loss of male authority 
(Atkinso et al., 2005). Similarly, Horning et al (1981) also analyzed the relationship 
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between IPV and occupational and educational incompatibilities. They found that couples 
in which a woman’s occupational status was higher than her husband’s status show 
higher rates of violence than their counterpart. Likewise, many other literatures state that 
if men define income or educational status as a power and when they feel that the power 
is lacking, the men will be more likely to rely on violence to achieve greater power 
within the relationship (Goode, 1971); in addition, the more a wife’s resources exceed 
those of her husband, the more likely husband perpetrates of domestic violence (Allen & 
Straus, 1980).  
Overall, feminist literatures suggest that a man’s lower relative status compared 
with his wife is associated with higher levels of violence.  As mentioned earlier, because 
lower-class men may have difficulty achieving greater educational or occupational status 
than their partner, when they feel their masculinity is challenged because of the 
incompatibilities of income, they commit violence toward their partner as a means to 
exert dominance and control (Campbell, 1993). Anderson (1997) suggests that because 
domestic violence is affected by social processes that support men’s cultural support for 
couplings in which men have greater resources than their female partners, men who have 
few resources such as earning lower income compared with their partner may engage in 
domestic violence as a means to gain power within the relationship. In order to measure if 
the women who have greater resources than their partner are more likely to be victims of 
IPV, employment status of both women and their partner is used.  
Conversely, unlike in the feminist literature, economists suggests different 
hypothesis about the effects of relative economic status between the men and women in 
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relationship based on the bargaining theory (Farmer & Tiefenthaler, 1997; Gibson-Davis 
et al., 2005; Lundberg & Pollak, 1996; Tauchen et al., 1991). Women’s property status or 
employment status shows a significant predictor of long-term physical and psychological 
violence. Statistically, women who own both a house and land are 20 times less likely to 
becoming victims of domestic violence than women who own neither (Agarwal & Panda, 
2007). In addition, decreases in the wage gap witnessed over the past 13 years can 
explain the 9% reduction in domestic violence against women (Aizer, 2010). These 
suggest that women’s independent ownership of property or reduces of the male-female 
wage gap could reduce her risk of domestic violence.  
Several studies suggest that when women’s economic status equals or exceeds 
that of their partner, levels of domestic violence decrease (Gibson-Davis et al, 2005; 
Tauchen et al., 1991). Tauchen et al. (1991) were the first to suggest domestic violence 
within an economic framework. They state that violence serves both an expressive and an 
instrumental purpose, meaning that violence enters the husband’s utility directly as well 
as indirectly through the wife’s behavior. Thus, men “purchase” violence from women 
with income transfer, so that the level of resources controlled by each partner and 
whether the reservation utility constraint is associated with determination of level of 
violence in equilibrium (Tauchen et al, 1991).  Using a sample of 125 women from 
shelters and other advocates for battered women, they used panel data on victims of 
domestic violence to examine the impact of changes in women’s income. They assumed 
that the assailant in the relationship makes his choices in order to maximize his expected 
utility and found out that negative correlation exists between domestic violence and 
women’s income for a subset of low-and middle- income couples in their sample. 
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Similarly, Gibson-Davis et al (2005) also examine the effect of employment on domestic 
abuse among low-income single mother. By analyzing two randomized evaluations of 
welfare program, they found that increased maternal employment decreases subsequent 
reports of domestic violence in both studies.  
Economists emphasize how partners use their power over resources to bargain in 
order to estimate the effects of employment on domestic violence. In their theoretical 
perspective, increasing women’s economic resources such as employment empowers her 
to bargain for a better situation for herself within the relationship, leading to reductions in 
women’s risk of domestic violence. Bowlus and Seit (2006) found that men married to 
women aged 15 to 29 are significantly more likely to commit domestic violence if their 
wives are not working. They also found out that among women aged 30 years above, the 
effect of the wife’s employment on her spouse’s abuse propensity is positive but 
insignificant, thus concluding that men are more likely to abuse nonworking wives in 
their sample. This result suggests that men do not use domestic violence as a means of 
keeping their partners out of the workforce, and men are less likely to abuse their partner 
who have better outside opportunities. These economists’ hypotheses about the effects of 
relative economic status between the men and women in the relationship are consistent 
with the hypothesis of this thesis. In addition, economist’s theory of bargaining can be 
used for prediction of AFDC for women who are married.  
If economic distress affects IPV, and if resolving the conflicts caused by 
economic distress may prevent IPV victimization, government aid programs might help 
to control the rate of IPV. Often, battered women experience a lack of support resources, 
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such as alternative housing, money, and employment (Sullivan et al., 1992). By providing 
these government aids, women could reduce their reliance on violent partners and 
possibly escape the relationship. For example, opportunity for employment provided by 
government aid can have a protective effect for women. It not only provides important 
financial resources but it also raises a woman’s self-esteem, which enhances her 
resources to cope with an abusive relationship. In fact, one in five women who reported 
unwanted or forced sexual relationships said that going to work lessened the abuse 
(Brush, 2003). Various studies have established a relationship between government aid 
and intimate violence. In 1992, Sullivan et al. hypothesize that social support such as 
women’s shelter would increase their level of life satisfaction and decrease their risk of 
further abuse, and found that all participants reported a decrease in abuse, fear, and 
depression. In addition, they found that for post-shelter social support, 42% of 
participants reported no depression at all. Campbell et al. (1995) also examined 
depression reported by women who had used a domestic violence shelter and found that 
many women were no longer physically abused by their intimate partner 10 weeks post 
shelter and at 6-month follow-up. In addition, they found that women who were happier 
with the quality of social support in their lives reported less depression. Moreover, Bybee 
and Sullivan (2002) focused on the advocacy intervention program for meditation process 
preventing re-victimization of domestic violence based on a prior experimental 
evaluation of advocacy program for victim of intimate partner violence (Sullivan & 
Bybee, 1999). The sample was drawn from a Midwest shelter program for women with 
abusive partners. If women spent at least one night in the shelter, and planned to stay in 
the general vicinity for the first 3 months post-shelter, the women were eligible for the 
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study. This was longitudinal study, followed up for 2 years. They offered specific 
intervention activities to women and analyze how this intervention affect intimate partner 
violence. The specific intervention activities includes assessing women’s needs and 
strengths with them, obtaining and sharing information about community resources with 
women as needed. Moreover, advocates intervention accompanied women as they kept 
appointments with government, and accompanied women through the court process. At 
24 month follow-up interviews, the group of women who receive advocacy intervention 
services reported less physical assault by their partner, better access to community 
resources, and improved quality of life and social support compared with women who did 
not receive advocacy intervention services. 
Their study is limited in its generalizability because the research participants were 
recruited from a battered women’s shelter located in a medium-sized city in the Midwest. 
Even though they gathered samples in a restricted area, their study pointed out the 
importance of social support. Similarly, Rodriguez et al. (2008) studied IPV and its 
relationship with social support among pregnant Latina women. They interviewed 210 
pregnant Latinas attending prenatal clinics located in Los Angeles, California. The 
samples consisted of women who did and did not have histories of IPV. In their study, 
social support was measured with both instrumental support (e.g., receiving 
transportation favors) and emotional support (e.g., having someone to talk to) from 
formal and informal sources. Finally, they found that social support was significantly 
lower among women who experienced IPV, thus concluding that pregnant Latinas who 
experienced IPV had more than twice the odds of reporting social undermining, and 
stress with less social support than women who experienced no IPV. Lastly, in 2003, 
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Dugan et al. used AFDC benefit level to assess the relationship between benefit levels 
and intimate partner homicide levels. They found the strongest effect for African 
American unmarried men—as AFDC benefits decline, more men are killed by their 
partners, suggesting that their partners have fewer alternatives to protect them from 
violence. This thesis also uses AFDC benefit level to assess the relationship between 
government aid and IPV. This thesis links the AFDC benefits level available to each 
woman and assesses its effects on IPV for low- income women.  
 
Hypothesis 
 So far, the problems of IPV in the United States and its severe consequences were 
presented. According to Thomson et al. (2000), partner violence can reduce perceived 
social support, which is related to increased distress and greater psychological distress. 
As it was mentioned earlier, strain theory would predict that more government aid will 
reduce the IPV of those living in poverty, whereas lower government aid will cause 
people living in poverty to have more general distress, which will possibly lead to IPV. In 
other words, for victims, reducing economic dependency on their partner empower them 
to bargain for a better situation for themselves or to leave abusive relationships which 
will eventually lead to lower prevalence of IPV (Vyas & Watts, 2009). Numerous 
researchers have demonstrated the relationship between social support and IPV. However, 
most typically focus on whether or not the social support has any effect on reducing IPV 
using sample gathered from a limited area, such as a specific district or state.  This thesis 
investigates the relationship between government aid and IPV in a representative sample 
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of women across the states using the data collected. The government aid is represented by 
AFDC benefit level in this thesis. If this thesis finds a relationship between government 
aid and IPV, it further informs officials on how to better administer government aid 
programs. Therefore, I propose the following two hypotheses:   
1) IPV is more prevalent for women who are living in poverty. 
2) Among women who are living in poverty, those who live in states with higher 
government benefits will be less likely to be victims of IPV than women who live 






Chapter 3: Data and Method 
 
Overview 
The data for this study come from the state identified “Full Report of the Prevalence, 
Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women,” available at ICPSR. Patricia 
Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes studied the prevalence, incidence and consequences of 
violence against women using these data (Tjaden and Thoennes, 2000). This study 
                                                          
1
 Since I do not know whether the woman is receiving government benefit, I assume that a woman receives 
government benefit if the woman  has income below the poverty line . 
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randomly selected 8,000 women who were 18 years of age or older residing in 
households through the United States, and using a national, random-digit dialing sample 
of telephone households in the United States from November 1995 to May 1996. The 
female respondents were asked about the psychological or physical assault they had 
experienced as children by adult caretakers, and the psychological or physical assault 
they had experienced as adults, including emotional abuse, forcible rape or stalking by 
any type of perpetrator. Since the topic in this survey is sensitive, all interviewers were 
female. The questionnaires asked about the specific characteristics of the assailant and 
any consequences the victim experienced from the incident, as well as respondent 
characteristics such as income, race, and age at the time of the incident. 
 The data on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits by state, 
which represents the amount of government benefits, comes from the annual versions of 
the “green book” compiled by the House Ways and Means Committee (1996). Data from 
1995 on the average monthly payment per family, presents State-specific information on 





The following variables have been selected for inclusion in the model.  The 
descriptive statistics of variables are summarized in Appendix C.  
Dependent Variable 
                                                          
2 The data are drawn from the Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Service 
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 The dependent variable is constructed from the survey questions. This study 
ultimately tries to reveal whether the prevalence of intimate partner violence 
victimization depends on poverty and AFDC benefit level. Thus, I first needed to figure 
out whether respondents who are currently in relationship with their partner were victims 
of intimate partner violence within the past year. According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), intimate partner violence is defined as ‘actual or 
threatened physical, sexual, psychological, or stalking violence by current or former 
intimate partners’ (Thompson, 2006). Therefore, I used the survey questions asking for 
the respondent’s experience of emotional, physical or sexual abuse within the past year.  
Because the questions included different types of intimate partner violence, this 
study provided a dependent variable that combines variables from these questions to 
express respondents’ experiences of intimate partner violence as dummy variable. (1= 
experienced IPV, 0= didn’t experience IPV). In other words, if the respondent answered 
yes to any of these questions, she is marked as having been a victim of intimate partner 
violence. Respondents who answered ‘don’t know’, but answered yes to any of the 
related types of intimate partner violence questions  are marked as having been a victim 
of intimate partner violence.  
Table1 shows the timetable indicating the year survey was conducted and the 
years that violence happened. For more precise results, this study used samples that had 
experienced IPV at the year of survey, meaning the IPV should have happened after 1994. 
However, because the data for the specified year when the emotional abuse happened was 
lacking, emotional abuse data used the most recent experience of intimate partner 
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violence for each respondent. In other words, emotional abuse was considered as each 
respondent’s experience of intimate partner violence by their last partner.  For this, the 
data used two survey questions which asked 1) the number of partners that respondent 
have had and 2) which partner is the one that emotionally abused respondent.  










Year 1995 to 1996 Any Time in 
the Past 
After 1994. After 1994 After 1994 
 
 
Because emotional abuse was not restricted to the previous year, two dependent 
variables are made which are purely physical violence/ and physical and emotional 
violence.   Purely physical violence includes IPV variables without emotional abuse 
victimization data, and physical and emotional IPV includes all IPV variables. By doing 
this, outcome variable will be more accurate than if there was just one dependent variable.  
 
Emotional Abuse Victimization 
Emotional abuse victimization variable is coded 1 if the respondent experienced 
emotional abuse in the previous year.  Otherwise, it is coded 0.  The specific survey 
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questions for emotional abuse are listed in Appendix D-1. If the respondent answered yes 
to any of these questions, and the partner’s behavior frightens her, she is marked as 
having been a victim of emotional abuse violence. 
Threat Victimization 
 Threatening variable victimization is coded 1 if the women were threatened harm 
or kill her by her partner in the previous year. Otherwise, it is coded 0.  
Physical Abuse Victimization 
Physical abuse victimization variable is coded 1 if the respondent were physically 
abused in the previous year. Otherwise, it is coded 0. The specific survey questions for 
physical abuse are listed in Appendix D-2.  
 
Rape Victimization 
Rape victimization variable is coded 1 if the respondent were raped in the 
previous year. Otherwise, it is coded 0.  The specific survey questions for rape 
victimization are listed in Appendix D-3.  
  Finally, as mentioned above, I made two dependent variables represent both 
purely physical violence/and physical and emotional violence. The purely physical 
violence variable is coded 1 if the respondent experienced a rape, threatened, or 
physically abused by her intimate partner in the previous year. Otherwise, it is coded 0. In 
the case of physical and emotional violence, it is coded 1 if the respondent experienced 
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an emotional abuse, rape, threatening or physical abuse by her partner in the previous 
year. Otherwise, it is coded 0.  
   
 
Primary Independent Variables for the First Hypothesis 
 
Poverty 
 Because the first hypothesis of this study is that IPV is more prevalent for women 
who are living in poverty, this study used income to construct one of the primary 
independent variables. In the survey, respondents were asked how much income they 
received.  Therefore, the poverty variable is a dummy variable to indicate whether the 
respondent lives below the poverty line. Table 2 presents the poverty thresholds for 1995 
by size of family and number of related children under 18 years from the Census Bureau 
(Baugher & Lamison-White, 1996). Basically, it shows that families or individuals with 
income below their appropriate poverty thresholds are classified as poor (Baugher & 
Lamison-White, 1996). For example, if a family comprises two people, including one 
child and the income is equal or less than $10,504, the family is assumed poor. This study 
established the standard of family income considered to be living in poverty by size of 
the family based on Table1 and matched the income to the size of the household in order 
to identify the poverty thresholds by size of family. Table 3 represents the family income 
considered living in poverty.  Thus, this study coded families with three people, with one 




Measurement of General Strain Theory (GST) 
 As mentioned earlier, the employment status of respondent’s partner and partner’s 
low income used to measure how the magnitude (=level of employment status/or level of 
income) affect strain, leading to IPV. For employment status of respondent’s partner, I 
created a dummy variable, ‘unemployment.’ Unemployment is coded 1 if respondent’s 
partner is currently unemployed and coded 0 if otherwise (i.e., employed part-time or 
employed full-time). In addition, in order to measure level of partner’s income, I created 
a dummy variable, ‘low-income partner’ which coded 1 if the income of respondent’s 
partner is less than $20,000. Otherwise, it is coded 0. Because employment status of 
partner is related to the income of household, it also helps to explain the first hypothesis 
that there is a higher prevalence of IPV for women who are living in poverty. 
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Table 2. Poverty Thresholds for 1995 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 18 Years 
Size of family unit Weighted average 
thresholds 
Related children under 18 years 
None One Two Three Four Five 
One person 7,763       
  Under 65 years 7,929 7,929      
      65 years and over 7,309 7,309      
Two Persons 9,933       
Household under 65 years 10,259 10,205 10,504     
Household 65 years and over 9,219 9,212 19,465     
Three persons 12,158 11,921 12,267 12,278    
Four persons 15,569 15,719 15,976 15,455 15,509   
Five person 18,408 18,956 19,232 18,643 18,187   
Source: . Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
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Table 3. The Primary Independent Variable- Poverty 
Size of Family Living in Poverty* Family Income Considered Living in Poverty 
One person Equal or less than $ 10,000 
Two persons Equal or less than $10,000 
Three persons Equal or less than $15,000 
Four persons Equal or less than $15,000 
Five persons Equal or less than $20,000 
Six persons Equal or less than $20,000 
Equal or less than $20,000 Seven persons 
Note: * Size of family includes the number of related children under 18 years.  
 
Low Self-control 
 As mentioned earlier, the theory of assortative mating could be an alternative 
explaining of IPV. In order to measure this explanation, low self-control variables for 
both women and their partner are created. Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general 
theory of crime asserts that the propensity to engage in criminal behavior in the presence 
of opportunity, is caused by a personality trait they call low self-control.  They also 
explain that low self control is not only “crime involves the pursuit of immediate, certain, 
easy benefits,” but also other seminal acts can be seen as analogous to crime, and 
research examining these noncriminal events “can help elucidate the nature of crime and 
criminality” (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990 P.42). Thus, this study uses drug usage as 
measurement of low self-control. Because drug makes people depressed, stimulated, or 
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hallucinated, it could be one of the factors to help elucidate the nature of crime and 
criminality as Gottfredson and Hirschi explained. In this study, low self-control is 
indicated by a person’s experiences of illegal drugs (e.g., marijuana, crack, heroin or 
angel dust).  I assumed that if each respondent or their intimate partner used illegal drugs 
in the past month, the respondent or intimate partner has low self-control. After creating 
each low self-control variable, I created low self-control for couple coded 1 if respondent 
and her partner have used illegal drugs in the past month. Otherwise, it is coded 0. 
However, the method of measuring low self-control can be the limitations of the study. 
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), effective parenting is the major cause of 
self-control of children. They assert that effective parenting leads to a general orientation 
that increase the probability of restrained or socially appropriate responses throughout 
life. Thus, lots of literatures use parent’s reports to measure their children’s low self-
control. In this study, however, the measurement of low self-control is based entirely on 
the woman’s report.  Even if the women can know their partner’s usage of illegal drugs,  
it is not as much as parent’s know their children’s low self-control. Moreover, because 
the women only take this survey, there is possibility that the women answer untruth about 
their partner’s behavior.  Therefore, measuring low self-control based entirely on the 
women’s report which has possibility of falsehood is one of the limitations of this study. 
 
High Income Women compared to their Partner 
 Feminist literatures assume that men who earn lower income compared with their 
partner may engage in domestic violence as a means to gain power within the relationship 
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(Anderson, 1997). In order to measure the argument of feminist literatures, the 
comparison of income for respondent and intimate partner is used.  Thus, comparison of 
income coded is coded 1 if respondent received higher or equal income than their partner. 
If respondent’s income is less than their partner, it is coded 0.  
 
Primary Independent Variables for the Second Hypothesis  
 
 
 Government aid (AFDC benefit level) 
 This study used the data “Average Monthly Number of AFDC Family and 
Recipients, Total Benefit Payments and Administrative Costs, and Average Payment per 
Family and Recipient, Fiscal Year 1995,” available at the Administration for Children 
and Families. The data were used to construct one of the primary independent variables 
because the second hypothesis of this study is that women who live in states that offer 
low government benefits will be more likely to be victim of IPV. In this study, the AFDC 
benefit level represents government benefit. Because every state has a different 
population, this study used average monthly payment of AFDC benefit per family in 
Appendix E. In order to make it easy to present the AFDC benefit level, the AFDC 





 Because only women who are eligible for AFDC should be sensitive to its level of 
benefits, the study used income again to construct one of the primary independent 
variables. The method to create poverty variable for the second hypothesis is the same as 
the poverty variable used in the first hypothesis in independent variable above.  
 
Poverty_afdc100  
 In order to allow the effects of AFDC to differ for those who are living below and 
above the poverty line, the study constructed an interaction variable between AFDC 
benefit level and living in poverty. The study expects this variable to have no relationship 




In order to reduce the bias due to omitted variables, this study included three 
control variables that other researchers have already mentioned, which could affect IPV. 
These control variables are racial background of respondent, alcohol consumption of both, 
respondent and intimate partner, and education of both respondent and intimate partner  
 
  Race Background of Women 
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Respondents were asked about their racial background during the interview. 
Because African Americans show higher rates of crime as well as poverty, omitting this 
variable could affect the estimate of government aid on victimization. Race is coded 1 if 
the respondent is Black or African-American. Otherwise, it is coded 0.  
 
 
Age of Women 
 Respondents were asked how old they are. Because young people show higher 
rates of crime then old people, age can be a good control variable. Age is a continuous 
variable that ranged 1 to 96 which is actual age of respondents at the time of survey.  
 
Alcohol Consumption of Both Respondent and Intimate Partner 
Alcohol consumption of both respondent and intimate partner was also included 
as a control variable. In the survey, respondents were asked how often their intimate 
partners drank alcohol. According to Zablotska et al. (2009), both physical violence and 
sexual coercion are more likely when alcohol was used before sex by at least one of the 
partners. Therefore, alcohol consumption might be a good control variable to estimate the 
relationship between government aid on victimization. Because alcohol consumption 
might be relevant to women and intimate partner, two variables are created for alcohol 
consumption. Alcohol consumption of both respondent and intimate partner is coded 1 if 
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respondent or intimate partner answered yes to drink of alcoholic beverages every day or 
nearly every day. Otherwise, it is coded 0.  
 
Education of Both Respondent and Intimate Partner 
Education for both respondent and intimate partners was added as control variable. 
Respondent’s education can be an empowerment to protect against intimate partner 
violence (Jewkes, 2002). This also means that women who have low educational 
attainment have a higher possibility to be a victim of intimate partner violence. Education 
for intimate partners can also be a control variable. Because low levels of education may 
also be an indicator of poor communication skills, which can be a possible cause of 
domestic violence, lower levels of education for men are also associated with an 
increased risk of intimate partner violence (Kyriacou, 1999). According to Lipsky et al.’s 
(2004) study of police-reported intimate partner violence during pregnancy, women 
reporting any intimate partner violence during pregnancy significantly have a lower 
education level than women who had no reported intimate partner violence. The 
educational level of violent father of infants was also significantly lower than non-violent 
father of infants. Education for both respondent and her intimate partner is coded 1 if the 





grade, some high school. If the highest level of education for respondent or her intimate 
partner is high school graduate, some college, four- year college degree (BA/BS), or 







 In order to make clear the relationship between government aid and IPV, 
diagrams are added using the variables mentioned above.  Figure 1-1 shows the first 
hypothesis that how the relationship between poverty and IPV. Each Employment status, 
low self-control, and low income partner were added to measure magnitude (=level of 
employment) of strain, assortative mating, and argument of feminist theory which are 
mentioned above. Figure 1-2 shows the second hypothesis that how government benefits 
affect IPV. If women are not poor, AFDC benefit will not affect. However, If women are 
living in poverty, AFDC benefit will affect, and those who live in states with higher 
AFDC benefits will show less likely to be victims of IPV than women who live in states 
with lower benefits.  
 The dependent variable in the regression models measures whether or not the 
respondents have experienced IPV (i.e., it is a binary variable with values of 0 and 1), 
which requires analysis using a nonlinear model. In the study, STATA 11’s logit 












Figure 1-1. Diagram for the First Hypothesis.  
Poverty
Employment 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
Description of Variables 
 Table 4 shows the description of dependent and primary independent variables. It 
shows that almost 21 percent of women experienced physical and emotional violence, 
and 0.5 percent of women experienced purely physical violence in the previous year. 
Comparing the percent of purely physical violence/ and physical and emotional violence, 
purely physical violence has much smaller proportion than physical and emotional 
violence. The table4 also indicates that 11 percent of women are living in poverty, and 
the average amount of AFDC benefit level is $346. The specific descriptions of variables 




Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Primary Independent Variable 
Variable Name N Range Mean SD 
Dependent Variable     
Physical and Emotional 
Violence  
7999 0 – 1 .2093 .04068 
Purely Physical 
Violence.  
7999 0 - 1 .0050 .0705 
Primary Independent 
Variables 
    
Poverty 8000 0 - 1 .117 .3214 
AFDC100 8000 1 - 7.21 3.4654 1.3534 
The following is the regressions assessed in the study.  The first logistic 
regression assesses the effect of living in poverty on IPV which is the first hypothesis of 
this study.  The second logistic regression assesses how government aid moderates the 
effect of living in poverty on intimate partner violence.  
The first logistic regression: the effect of living in poverty on IPV  
Because the study contains two independent variables which are IPV and IPV 
excluding emotional abuse, there are two equations exists to measure the first hypothesis. 
The first equation, examine the output of IPV including emotional abuse is following: 
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The second equation, examine the output of IPV excluding emotional abuse is following: 
 





         
 
               
 
                
  
 
                   
 
                  
P (                         =1) = 
                                                   




                    
 
                 
  
 
                    
 
                 
 
  
Table 5 shows the results from the logistic regression of factors cause IPV. As 
mentioned earlier, this result contains the variables which have probability to cause IPV. 
The two columns show how poverty, employment status, low self-control, and income 
comparison between couple affect physical and emotional violence or purely physical 
violence controlling for race, education for both women and partner, and alcohol 





Living in poverty ( = .31) positively and significantly influence IPV at p<0.01 when 
physical and emotional violence is measured. This result supports the first hypothesis of 
this study that IPV is more prevalent for women who are living in poverty. However, 
when analyzing the data with purely physical violence, it shows different result. In this 
result, poverty ( = -.46) shows negative direction, but, not significantly related to IPV 
 
 
Table 5. The Effect of Living in Poverty on IPV.  
Variable Name Physical and Emotional 
Violence (N=7999) 
Purely Physical Violence 
(N=7999) 
 (SE) Odds Ratio  (SE) Odds Ratio 
Poverty .31*** (.11) 1.39 .-.46 (.82) 0.63 
Testing GST     
Unemployment .039***(.014) 1.04 (omitted) (omitted) 
Low Income Partner .21*** (.08) 1.24 .56 (.53) 1.74 
Low Self Control     
Couple’s History of 
Drug 
1.43*** (.19) 4.16 1.60*** 
(.63) 
4.96 
Income Comparison .27 (.07) 1.32 -.40 (.50) .68 
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Control Variables     





.08(.21) 1.08 (omitted) (omitted) 
Low Education (partner) .21 (.16) 1.23 .34 (1.07) 1.40 
Alcohol Consumption 
(women) 
-.11 (.17) .89 .51 (1.16) 166 
Alcohol Consumption 
(partner) 






Note: In purely physical violence, unemployment was dropped in which there is no 
variation on purely physical violence. 
*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 
 
Measurement of General Strain Theory 
Both unemployment status of partner ( = .039) and partner’s low income ( = .21) 
positively and significantly influence on physical and emotional violence at p<0.01. 
These results are enough to supports the general strain theory that the unemployment 
status, or low income causes more strain to partner than counterparts, leading higher 
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likelihood of IPV. When purely physical violence is measured, partner’s low income 
( = .56) still shows positive, but insignificantly influences on IPV. Whether the partner is 
unemployed is not measured in purely physical violence because it predicts failure 
perfectly.  
  
Low Self Control 
 Low self control variable is used to measure the alternative explaining of IPV 
which is the theory of assortative mating. In the result, a couple has low self-control ( = 
1.43) shows positively and significantly influence on physical and emotional violence at 
p<0.01. Moreover, low self-control ( = 1.60) also positively and significantly influences 
on purely physical violence at p<0.01.  
  
Income Comparison 
 Income comparison between respondents and their partner used to measure 
argument of feminist literatures that men who earn lower income compare with their 
partner may engage more likely in IPV. The result shows that income comparison 
between couples is not significantly influences on both physical and emotional violence 
( = .27) / and purely physical violence ( = .40) at p<0.01. Thus, feminist literatures 
cannot assume that IPV is more prevalent for women who earn higher income compared 





 All control variables except partner’s alcohol consumption shows insignificant 
impact on physical and emotional violence. Partner’s alcohol consumption ( = .46) 
significantly influenced on the likelihood of physical and emotional violence at p<0.01. 
However, when purely physical violence is measured, partner’s alcohol consumption no 
longer becomes significant. The race of respondent ( = -1.32) also shows its significance 
on purely physical violence. However, it shows negative relationship which is the 
opposite direction I expected. In addition, age ( = -.006) negative and significantly 
influenced on the likelihood of both physical and emotional violence, and purely physical 
violence. It indicates that young women more likely be victimized physically and 
emotionally by their intimate partner than old women  
 The second logistic regression: how government aid moderates the effect of living in 
poverty on IPV.   
This logistic regression assesses the second hypothesis of this study. Same as the 
first logistic regression, there are two equations exists to measure the second hypothesis 
because of two dependent variables. The first equation, examine the output of IPV 
including emotional abuse is following: 
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The second equation, examine the output of IPV excluding emotional abuse is following: 
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Table 6 shows the results from the logistic regression of relationship between 
government benefits and IPV. The two columns show how government aid moderates 
living in poverty on physical and emotional violence or purely physical violence, 
controlling for race, education for both women and partner, and alcohol consumption for 
both women and partner. In order to allow the effects of AFDC benefits to differ for 
those who are living below and above the poverty line, an interaction variable between 
AFDC benefit level and poverty were included.  
When physical and emotional violence is measured, government aid ( = -.004) 
shows negative, but not significantly influence on the prevalence of IPV at p<0.1. 
However, poverty ( = 1.14) significantly increased the likelihood of IPV at p<0.01. The 
44 
 
interaction between poverty and government aid ( = -.55) also shows negative, but not 
significantly influence on the prevalence of IPV.  When purely physical violence is 
measured, the government aid ( = -.05) also shows negative, but not significantly 
influences on the prevalence of IPV. Figure 2 is a graph shows how poverty affects the 
relationship between government aid and prevalence of IPV.  
In figure2, the x-axis represents AFDC benefit level and y-axis is the likelihood of 
IPV. Even if the result shows that government benefit is not significantly related to IPV, 
the graph tells us that government aid, at least, moderates the likelihood of IPV. As I 
expected earlier, this graph shows that government aid does not affect women who are 
not living in poverty. However, it shows that the likelihood of IPV decreases for those 
who live in states with higher government benefit level among women living in poverty  
 
Table 6. Government Aid Moderates the Effect of Living in Poverty on IPV 
Variable Name Physical and Emotional 
Violence (N=7999) 
Purely Physical Violence 
(N=7999) 
 (SE) Odds Ratio  (SE) Odds Ratio 
AFDC100 -.004 (.03) 1.00 -.05 (.22) .95 
Poverty 1.14*** (.23) 3.14 -1.04 (2.10) .24 
Poverty_AFDC100 -.55 (.27) .94 .26(.50) 1.30 
Control Variables     
Unemployment .04*** (.01) 1.04 (omitted) (omitted) 
Low Income Partner .21*** (.08) 1.24 .56 (.53) 1.75 
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4.17 1.62** (.65) 5.05 
Income Comparison .28*** (.07) 1.32 -.38 (.50) .68 
Age .08 (.06) .08 1.53*** (.57) 4.60 
Minor Race -.07 (.14) 0.93 -1.30** (.59) .27 
Low Education (women) .08 (.21) 1.08 (omitted) (omitted) 





.89 .48 (1.16) 1.62 
Alcohol Consumption 
(partner) 
.46*** (.10) 1.59 .008(.84) 1.00 
Note: In purely physical violence, unemployment was dropped in which there is no 
variation on purely physical violence, low education for women was dropped in which 
there is no variation on purely physical violence.  














Chapter 5: Discussion and Limitation 
This study estimated the relationship between the amounts of government aid 
provided and IPV, while controlling for other relevant factors. Logistic regression was 
applied to likelihood of IPV and tested two hypotheses. My first hypothesis was 
supported by identifying that living in poverty positively and significantly influences on 
IPV. Finally, this study found out that living in poverty is 1.39 times more likely be 













































AFDC benefit level 
living in poverty=0 
Living in Povery=1 
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when IPV is measured without emotional abuse, living in poverty was no longer 
significantly influences on IPV and even shows negative relationship.  It indicates that 
living in poverty is not enough to significantly predict IPV when there is a severe IPV 
occurs. The notable result from this study is that couple’s history of drug which 
represents measurement of assortative mating shows bigger magnitude when IPV 
becomes more severe.  Therefore, if living in poverty was not significantly related to IPV, 
the theory of assortative mating could be an alternative explanation of this study.  
General strain theory was identified by measuring the relationship between 
unemployment status of partner/and partner’s income and likelihood of IPV.  In fact, 
likelihood of IPV was 1.04 times higher for women who have unemployed partner than 
women who have partner employed part-time or full-time. Moreover, respondents who 
have partner receiving low income are 1.24 times more likely to be victims of IPV than 
women who have partner receiving median or high income. As mentioned earlier, these 
factors cause strain, increasing the likelihood of experiencing negative emotions. Thus, 
these results support the argument of general strain theory that the partner who has low 
income or unemployed is more likely to commit IPV than a partner who is employed or 
receives higher income to alleviating these strains.  
As mentioned earlier, much of the feminist literature claims that women are more 
likely be a victim of IPV when they earn more money than their partner. The feminist 
literature views that intimate violence might be used to compensate for the symbolic loss 
of male authority if women earn a significant portion of household income (Atkinso et al., 
2005). Conversely, economists suggest that IPV will decrease if women’s economic 
48 
 
status equals or exceeds that of their partner which is consistent with my hypothesis. By 
identifying the income comparison between women and their partner, this study found 
out that women’s income which is higher than their partner is not significantly related to 
prevalence of IPV.  
When analyzing AFDC benefits level which represents government benefit, it 
becomes insignificant. Hence, my second hypothesis that likelihood of IPV will be lower 
for those who live in states with higher government benefits was not supported. As seen 
in figure 2, the direction of variable, at least tells us that government aid somewhat 
moderates the likelihood of IPV for women who live in states with higher government 
benefits than women who live in states with lower benefits.  However, the magnitude was 
small. The AFDC benefits level may not be enough to measure the effect on the IPV. 




The large sample size should provide sufficient statistical power to detect any 
relationship between government aid and intimate partner violence. However, because 
the survey was administrated by telephones, the sample only includes the population who 
has telephones, reducing the generalization to only the experiences of women living with 
telephones. This may essentially be a problem since extremely poor women are most 
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likely to not have telephones. Thus, failure to reach populations without phones could 
results to demographic selection bias.  
 As mentioned earlier, there is also limitation to measure one of types of strain. 
Strain as failure to achieve positively valued goals and strain as actual or anticipated 
removal of positively valued stimuli cannot be measured in the study. Moreover, recency, 
duration, and clustering which are measurement factors of strain cannot be measured.   
  
 
Implication and conclusion 
In this study, the relationship between living in poverty and likelihood of IPV was 
supported. This implies that women who living in poverty have to be focused in order to 
prevent the prevalence of IPV.  Even though the government aid was not significantly 
related to IPV, solving the problem of poverty might be a government’s role by 
establishing proper policy.  
As mentioned earlier, feminist literature explains that IPV will occurs as a means 
to exert dominance and control when lower-class men feel their masculinity is challenged 
because of incompatibilities of income (Campbell, 1993). However, this study does not 
support the feminist literature, meaning that income comparison between men and 
women do not increase IPV. Thus, feminist literature needs more developed research 
method to measure the relationship between economic comparison and IPV. If the 
research is developed, and the results of study tells that government aid decrease IPV, 
50 
 
government, government should offer various aids which increase women’s economic 
resources empowers them to bargain for better situation for themselves or to leave 
abusive relationship. This government implication makes women to get rid of economic 
dependency on their partner, eventually leading to lower IPV rates.  The government aid 
indicates not only give them money, but also offer more jobs to them. Offering more jobs 
to women might be better than just give them money, because women can increase 
chance to experience with society, eventually makes them more empowered with society. 
For example, in table5, income comparison between men and women positively related to 
IPV. Thus, creating job will not only offer experience with society which can learn the 
way to cooperate with their partner, but also gives women more money, leading 
decreased income comparison.  
For the future research, government benefits level is worth studying, but should 
be re-evaluated with better data. If the future research uses the sample who are actually 
receives government aid, the results will be more accurate. Moreover, because this study 
analyzed only women who have a telephone, there might not have been enough variation 
to pick up a finding. Therefore, in order to develop the study, future research should use 
other methods which might pick up an effect. With these accurate data, the future study 
will provide information on how officials can manage and monitor IPV and its victims on 
a daily basis by allowing them to better target resources. The issue of IPV not only 
severely harms victims at the time of the violation. It might also affect their whole life 
through prolonged trauma. Thus, future study will help officials stem the problem of IPV 
at the root through a preventative rather than reactionary policy of instituting reforms 









Census Bureau Poverty Thresholds, 1993-2010 
Family 
Size 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1 $7,363 $7,547 $7,763 $7,995 $8,183 $8,316 $8,501 $8,794 $9,039 
2 $9,414 $9,661 $9,933 $10,233 $10,473 $10,634 $10,869 $11,239 $11,569 
3 $11,522 $11,821 $12,158 $12,516 $12,802 $13,003 $13,290 $13,738 $14,128 
4 $14,763 $15,141 $15,569 $16,036 $16,400 $16,660 $17,029 $17,603 $18,104 
5 $17,449 $17,900 $18,408 $18,952 $19,380 $19,680 $20,127 $20,819 $21,405 
6 $19,718 $20,235 $20,804 $21,389 $21,886 $22,228 $22,727 $23,528 $24,195 
7 422,383 $22,923 $23,552 $24,268 $24,802 $25,257 $25,912 $26,754 $27,517 




2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1 49,183 $9,393 $9,645 $9,973 $10,294 $10,590 $10,997 $11,074 $11,351 
2 $11,756 $12,015 $12,334 $12,755 $13,167 $13,540 $14,060 $14,158 $14,512 
3 $14,348 $14,680 $15,067 $15,577 $16,079 $16,530 $17,165 $17,285 $17,717 
4 $18,392 $18,810 $19,307 $19,971 $20,614 $21,203 $22,017 $22,171 $22,725 
5 $21,744 $22,245 $22,831 $23,613 $24,382 $25,080 $26,043 $26,225 $26,881 
6 $24,576 $25,122 $25,788 $26,683 $27,560 $28,323 $29,410 $29,616 $30,356 
7 $28,001 $28,544 $29,236 $30,249 $31,205 $32,233 $33,471 $33,705 $34,548 





 Gross Income Limit, Need Standard, and Maximum Monthly Potential, AFDC, One-Parent Family of Three Persons, January 1996.  
State Gross income 
limit (185 % of 
“need” standard) 
100 % of “need” 
(need standard) 
Payment standard Maximum AFDC 
grant 
AFDC benefits as a 
percent of 1996 
poverty guidelines 
Alabama $1,245 $673 $164 $164 15 
Alaska 1,902 1,028 1,028 923 68 
Arizona 1,783 964 347 347 32 
Arkansas 1,304 705 204 204 19 
California 1,351 730 730 607 56 
Colorado 779 421 421 421 39 
Connecticut 1,613 872 872 636 59 
Delaware 625 338 338 338 31 
District of Columbia 1,317 712 420 420 39 
Florida 1,943 1,050 303 303  
Georgia 784 424 424 280 26 
Guam 611 330 330 330 31 
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Gross Income Limit, Need Standard, and Maximum Monthly Potential, AFDC, One-Parent Family of Three Person, January 1996. 
(cont’d) 
State Gross income limit 
(185 % of “need” 
standard) 
100 % of “need” 
(need standard) 
Payment standard Maximum AFDC 
grant 
AFDC benefits as a 
percent of 1996 
poverty guidelines 
Hawaii 2,109 1,140 712 712 57 
Idaho 1,833 991 377 377 29 
Illinois 1,782 963 377 377 35 
Indiana 592 320 288 288 27 
Iowa 1,571 849 426 426 39 
Kansas 794 429 429 429 40 
Kentucky 973 526 526 262 24 
Louisiana 1,217 658 190 190 18 
Maine 1,023 553 553 418 39 
Maryland 956 517 373 373 34 
Massachusetts 1,045 565 565 565 52 
Michigan:      





Gross Income Limit, Need Standard, and Maximum Monthly Potential, AFDC, One-Parent Family of Three Person, January 1996. 
(cont’d) 
State Gross income limit 
(185 %of “need” 
standard) 
100 % of “need” 
(need standard) 
Payment standard Maximum AFDC 
grant 
AFDC benefits as a 
percent of 1996 
poverty guidelines 
(Wane Co.) 1,019 551 459 459 42 
Minnesota 984 532 532 532 49 
Mississippi 681 368 368 120 11 
Missouri 1,565 846 292 292 27 
Montana 1,001 541 541 425 932 
Nebraska 673 364 364 364 34 
New Hampshire 3,763 2,034 550 550 51 
New Jersey 1,822 985 443 424 39 
New Mexico 720 389 389 389 36 
New York:      
(New York city) 1,067 577 577 577 53 
(Suffolk Co.) 1,301 703 703 703 65 





Gross Income Limit, Need Standard, and Maximum Monthly Potential, AFDC, One-Parent Family of Three Persons, January 1996. 
(cont’d) 
State Gross income limit 
(185 % of “need” 
standard) 
100 % of “need” 
(need standard) 
Payment standard Maximum AFDC 
grant 
AFDC benefits as a 
percent of 1996 
poverty guidelines 
North Dakota 797 431 431 431 40 
Ohio 1,709 924 341 341 32 
Oklahoma 1,193 645 307 307 28 
Oregon 851 460 460 460 43 
Pennsylvania 1,136 614 421 421 39 
Puerto Rico 666 360 180 180 17 
Rhode Island 1,025 554 554 554 51 
South Carolina 969 524 200 200 18 
South Dakota 938 507 200 200 40 
Tennessee 1,079 583 583 185 17 
Texas 1,389 751 188 188 17 
Utah 1,051 568 568 426 39 









State Gross income limit 
(185 % of “need” 
standard) 
100 % of “need” 
(need standard) 




AFDC benefits as a 




Virgin Island 727 300 354 354 22 
Virginia 555 393 240 240 33 
Washington 2,316 1,252 546 546 50 
West Virginia 1,833 991 253 253 23 
Wisconsin 1,197 647 517 517 48 
Wyoming 1,247 674 590 360 33 
Median AFDC state 720 389  389 36 
                                                          
3 In most States these benefit amount apply also to two-parent families (where the second parent is incapacitated or unemployed). Some, however, increase 
benefits for such families 
4
 In state with area differentials, figure shown is for area with highest benefit 
5
 This column is based on the 1996 poverty guideline for a family of three persons in the 48 contiguous States, $12,980, converted to a monthly rate of $1,082. 
For Alaska, the guideline is $16,220; for Hawaii, $14,930.  




Descriptive Statistics of the Variables. 
Variable Name N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable      
Physical and Emotional 
Violence 
7999 .2093 .04068 0 1 
Purely Physical 
Violence 
7999 .0050 .0705 0 1 
Independent Variables      
Government benefits      
AFDC100 8000 3.4654 1.3534 1 7.21 
Living in poverty      
Poverty 8000 .117 .3214 0 1 
Poverty_afdc100 8000 .3973 1.19 0 7.21 
Measurement of GST      
Unemployment 7999 .2612 1.6751 0 1 
Partner’s Low Income 7999 .2151 .4109 0 1 
Low Self-Control      
History of Drug 
(women) 
7999 .0145 .1195 0 1 
History of Drug 
(partner) 
7999 .02 .1400 0 1 
Income Comparison      
High Income Women 7999 .0829 .2757 0 1 
Control Variables      
Minor Race 7999 .944 .2299 0 1 
Alcohol Consumption 
for Women 




Descriptive Statistics of the Variables (cont.) 
Variable Name N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Control Variables      
Alcohol Consumption 
for Partner 
7999 .0675 .2509 0 1 
Low Education for 
Women 
7999 .1070 .3091 0 1 
Low Education for 
Partner 













D-1: The Specific Survey Question for Emotional Abuse Victimization happened within 





D-2: The specific survey question for Physical abuse victimization happened within the 
past year 
 
 Does your partner call you names or put you down in front of others? 
 Does your partner shout or swear at you?  
 Does your partner prevent you from knowing about, or having access to 
the family income even when you ask?  
 Does your partner prevent you from working outside the home?  
 Does your partner insist on changing residences even when you don’t 
need or want to? 
 Does this behavior frighten you?  
 
 Does your partner throw something at you that could hurt 
you?  
 Does your partner push, grab or shove you? 
 Does your partner pull your hair?  
 Does your partner slap or hit you?  
 Does your partner kick or bite you?  
 Does your partner choke or attempt to drown you?  
 Does your partner hit you with some object?  
 Does your partner beat you up?  
 Does your partner threaten you with a gun?  
 Does your partner threaten you with a knife or other weapon 
besides a gun?  
 Does your partner use a gun on you?  
 Does your partner use a knife or other weapon on you 
















 Does your partner made you have sex with him by using force or 
threatening to harm you? Just so there is no mistake, by sex we 
mean putting a penis in your vagina 
 Does your partner made you have oral sex by using force or 
threat of harm? Just so there is no mistake, by oral sex we mean 
that a man or a boy puts his penis in your mouth, or penetrates 
your vagina or anus with their mouth or tongue 
 Does your partner made you have anal sex with him by using 
force or threat of harm? Just so there is no mistake, by anal sex 
we mean that a man or a boy puts his penis in your anus 
 Does your partner put fingers or objects in your vagina or anus 





Average Monthly Number of AFDC Families and Recipients, Total Benefit Payments and Administrative Costs, and Average 
Payment per Family and Recipient, Fiscal Year 1995 




Average Monthly Payment per Total Admin. 
Cost 
Admin. Cost per 
AFDC Family Family Recipient 
Alabama $82.6 118 $148 $58 $22.4 $482 
Alaska 107.3 37 721 241 9.9 798 
Arizona 251.2 190 299 110 43.9 626 
Arkansas 48.8 63 168 64 12.7 525 
California 6,145.4 2,678 555 191 587.5 639 
Colorado 142.8 109 305 109 24.9 638 
Connecticut 383.1 170 521 187 32.7 533 
Delaware 36.4 25 268 119 7.5 664 
D.C 124.1 73 379 141 24.1 883 
Florida 763.8 618 277 103 153.0 667 
Georgia 414.4 382 248 90 58.1 417 
Guam 13.7 8 544 141 2.0 952 
Hawaii 172.8 66 649 218 11.2 505 
Idaho 31.6 24 286 108 8.8 957 
Illinois 882.1 696 311 106 119.4 506 
Indiana 196.6 189 248 87 36.5 553 
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Average Monthly Number of AFDC Families and Recipients, Total Benefit Payments and Administrative Coasts, and Average 
Payment per Family and Recipient, Fiscal Year 1995 (cont.)  




Average Monthly Payment per Total Admin. 
Cost 
Admin. Cost per 
AFDC Family Family Recipient 
Iowa 149.4 100 342 124 27.9 766 
Kensas 113.6 80 336 118 11.1 394 
Kentucky 182.6 188 203 81 32.5 433 
Louisiana 151.1 251 157 50 19.2 240 
Maine 101.1 60 380 140 6.9 311 
Maryland 307.9 223 345 115 121.7 1,638 
Massachusetts 646.1 271 537 199 88.5 882 
Michigan 999.8 597 414 140 166.2 826 
Minnesota 356.0 167 520 177 63.8 1,117 
Mississippi 75.1 143 120 44 14.6 280 
Missouri 275.6 254 257 90 30.3 340 
Montana 48.3 33 350 121 11.9 1,035 
Nebraska 56.7 41 309 114 25.0 1,634 
Nevada 51.6 41 267 106 15.3 950 
New Hampshire 56.9 28 420 167 10.9 965 




Average Monthly Number of AFDC Families and Recipients, Total Benefit Payments and Administrative Costs, and Average 
Payment per Family and Recipient, Fiscal Year 1995 (cont.) 




Average Monthly Payment per Total Admin. Cost 
(mill.) 
Admin. Cost per 
AFDC Family Family Recipient 
New Mexico 154.1 104 372 123 25.3 733 
New York 3,042.3 1,255 554 202 587.2 1,284 
North Carolina 334.4 313 221 89 75.8 602 
North Dakota 22.6 14 362 131 8.3 1,596 
Ohio 849.1 612 310 116 92.0 403 
Oklahoma 152.0 123 280 103 36.3 803 
Oregon 180.8 104 383 145 64.2 1,634 
Pennsylvania 904.7 596 368 126 125.4 611 
Puerto Rico 68.3 168 103 34 13.6 246 
Rhode Island 133.6 61 504 182 12.2 552 
South Carolina 107.1 128 181 70 20.0 407 
South Dakota 22.7 17 300 111 4.4 698 
Tennessee 198.7 255 172 65 38.0 394 
Texas 519.8 742 159 58 202.3 742 
Utah 69.7 46 340 126 17.6 1,029 
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